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Abstract – The paper presents a technical overview of a 
large research project on Dynamic Security Assessment 
(DSA) supported by EU. Transient Stability Assessment 
and Control, which was one of the main goals of the 
project, is taken into consideration by presenting the 
fundamental theoretical methodology and possible 
applications. A specific prototype installation for a 
realistic power system is then reported by presenting and 
commenting some of the obtained results. 
Keywords: Dynamic Security Assessment, Transient 
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Rescheduling. 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Power systems have traditionally been operated 
based on a background of previously performed studies 
and on the experience of dispatcher operators. Such 
practice usually leads to conservative limits and often 
cannot comply with market requirements to fully 
exploit power system equipment, plants and facilities 
and with transparency criteria in case of conflictual 
decisions imposed by regulating bodies. On the other 
hand, the operator may have to face new operating 
conditions brought about by the restructured power 
market and may lack adequate experience to operate the 
system, the current trend being to operate power 
systems closer and closer to their limits. This results in 
increased risks of instability, both of the transient and of 
the voltage type [1].  
These considerations emphasise the need for accurate 
evaluation of security, performed on different phases of 
power system operation and in particular made 
available to the control room operator for on-line 
assessment. The accurate evaluation of security margins 
may result in more transactions accepted, thus 
improving competition without jeopardizing the overall 
integrity of the system and preventing the risk of severe 
outages and black-out.  A better compromise between 
market and power system security requirements may 
then be achieved. 
Although severe system outages are typically caused 
by several different concomitant conditions, recent and 
remote black-out histories testify that an effective and 
timely monitoring of the systems might have prevented 
them from total collapse or, at least, might have 
significantly helped in reducing the dimension and 
duration of the outage both in the emergency conditions 
and in the restoration phase. 
The tremendous advances in computer science and 
technologies have provided the technical support and 
environment for on-line applications of methodologies 
concerning DSA that have been developed in the last 
decades. General DSA requirements and some of these 
applications have been thoroughly reported in [2]. Other 
tentative applications are reported in [3], [4]. 
In the DSA context, a research project partially 
supported by the European Union within the aims of the 
Framework V- Energy scheme and  named OMASES – 
Open Market Access and Security Assessment System 
[5] has produced interesting results.  
OMASES developed an integrated DSA tool that 
attempts to cope with the above mentioned challenging 
requirements. A software platform composed of 
integrated tools is linked to existing Energy 
Management Systems (EMS) to get power system data 
on-line and to perform Dynamic Security Assessment 
(DSA) analyses within a time suitable for on-line 
operation and preventive action implementation. 
The OMASES tool performs four main functions: 
Transient Stability Assessment (TSA), Voltage Stability 
Assessment, Training Simulator and Market Simulator. 
The experimentation phase consisted of applying and 
testing the tool on-line at two different sites, namely at 
HTSO (the Greek Transmission System Operator) [7] 
and at CESI [4] (a Research Centre that operated a 
remote connection to GRTN, the Italian TSO). 
The next sections of the paper focus on Transient 
Stability Assessment and Control (TSA&C) activities 
performed on the Italian experimentation site. 
2 OMASES: A SYNTHETIC PRESENTATION  
2.1 Generalities 
OMASES aim was to provide Energy Management 
System (EMS) operators with a DSA tool to be used on-
line during the normal cycle of real-time operation, in 
operational planning and as a dispatcher training 
simulator including a simulation of the deregulated 
electric market environment. OMASES is realized 
  
through various application functions: TSA – Transient 
Stability Assessment, VSA – Voltage Stability 
Assessment, TS – Training Simulator and MS – Market 
Simulator.  
OMASES can be inserted in existing EMS or  
engineered into new EMS structure as it is essentially 
based on a LAN structure for inter-machine 
communications allowing easy hardware and software 
integration. The four OMASES Application Functions 
(TSA, VSA, MS, TS) run in a distributed environment, 
with a link to the host EMS over which a real-time 
picture of the power network is obtained. The overall 
architecture, shown in Figure 1, includes: a data server 
which hosts any shared information, database systems, 
message systems, etc.; an appropriate server (even in 
parallel computing configuration) for each Application 
Function; computer systems to be used by operation 




























Figure 1:  OMASES architecture and Application Functions 
Three different operating modes are made available 
to system operators: (1) Engineering mode, (2) Real-
time mode, (3) Training mode. 
(1) Engineering mode: off-line application of TSA 
and VSA studies involving or not the market 
environment and performed mainly for planning 
purposes  
(2) Real-time mode: the EMS feeds OMASES with 
network data and solutions. DSA is synchronized with 
data transfer and cyclically runs with an overall 
execution time within 15 minutes 
(3) Training mode: the operator gets used with the 
DSA tools and power system dynamics, performs 
analysis (future scenarios, post-event analysis, etc.) of 
the existing electrical system and/or experiments. 
Market rules can be used to provide realistic 
scenarios. 
2.2 DSA Application Functions 
DSA tools for the Engineering mode are relatively 
widely available at least for TSA and VSA. These are in 
fact quite mature methodologies and techniques. 
Effective Real-time mode and realistic Training mode 
applications have been developed and are still under test 
[2], [3], [4]. It is instead evident that both TS and MS 
are much more related to specific requirements posed 
by existing simulation tools adopted by each TSO and 
by specific market structure. Therefore, within 
OMASES, MS is intended to provide credible scenarios 
for subsequent TS and DSA activities and TS is strictly 
related to one specific simulator.  
The TSA and VSA Application Functions operate in 
a similar way by investigating a large number of 
contingencies (that may amount to almost one thousand 
for large power systems), by filtering them and ranking 
in accordance to their severity. Advanced tools also 
provide possible remedial actions for those 
contingencies that may affect system security. Each of 
the TSA and VSA functions calculates system security 
indices and margins for a set of contingencies applied 
on a real time scenario directly taken from the EMS 
(Real-time mode) or a simulated one generated by the 
TS (Training mode). 
The VSA Application Function [6] integrates 
software tools for the assessment of Voltage Security 
into the DSA package of the OMASES platform. This 
includes, among others, the analysis of the impact of 
significant contingencies and the determination of 
secure operation limits in terms of power transfers in 
critical corridors or power consumption in load areas. 
For a given direction of stress and a given contingency, 
the Secure Operation Limit (SOL) of the system 
corresponds to the most stressed pre-contingency 
operating point such that the system responds to the 
contingency in an acceptable way [7]. 
Within OMASES the TS is expected to run on-line 
or in the Training mode. In the former case it has to 
play interactively any scenario starting from an actual 
operating point extracted from the EMS and taking into 
account any kind of disturbances or operator actions. In 
the latter case, the simulator must reproduce the real 
time, that is to say that an accurate simulated state of the 
system must be displayed at the operator station 
according to the refreshment time of the EMS (about 2 
to 10 s). To reach this twofold target, OMASES bases 
its developments on two different codes proprietary of 
Tractebel: EUROSTAG and FAST [8]. 
Transient Stability Assessment and Control 
(TSA&C) being the core of the presented application, 
the next section is dedicated to SIME [9] that is the 
specific method adopted in OMASES. 
2.3 TSA&C: Transient Stability Assessment &  Control 
The SIME (for SIngle Machine Infinite Bus 
Equivalent) method has been developed at the 
University of Liege [10]. The SIME method is a hybrid 
method based on a generalized One-Machine Infinite 
Bus (OMIB) method. More precisely, it is a hybrid, 
temporal-direct method: temporal, since it relies on the  
multi-machine  system evolution with time; direct, like 
the EEAC (for Extended Equal-Area Criterion) [11], 
from which it originates. 
SIME transforms the trajectories of a multi-machine 
power system provided by a time-domain program into 
the trajectory of a OMIB equivalent. SIME drives a 
time-domain (T-D) transient stability program to 
extract, step-by-step, the multi-machine system 
parameters and transform them into the OMIB ones.  
The fundamental difference between the original 
version of  EEAC and SIME is that EEAC  relies on a 
  
time-invariant OMIB that it constructs by assuming the 
classical simplified machine and network modelling and 
by ``freezing'' once and for all the machine rotor angles 
at the time of the disturbance inception. As a 
consequence,  EEAC is a pure direct method, free from 
any transient stability  program; it thus  yields analytical 
expressions that are  extraordinarily fast to compute, but 
introduces approximations about the machines 
coherency and their (over)simplified  modelling. 
The SIME method instead refreshes the OMIB 
parameters at each time step of the time-domain 
program. It calls upon the Equal-Area Criterion (EAC), 
in order to identify the critical machines (CMs) and to 
compute stability margins. By doing so, SIME achieves:  
 
• fast stability analysis, in terms of stability limits 
relative to a contingency scenario 
• ultra fast contingency screening 
• sensitivity analysis 
• control, i. e., design of countermeasures able to 
stabilize an unstable scenario 
• physical insight and interpretations via EAC. 
 
SIME may be used in: expansion planning, for 
screening contingencies and for sensitivity analysis; 
operation planning, for congestion management 
problems and for ATC (Available Transmission 
Capacity) calculations; real-time operation, in a 
preventive mode, for scanning a set of plausible 
contingencies, identifying the harmful ones, assessing 
their severity and proposing to the operator remedial 
actions able to make the system withstand such 
contingencies. A further implementation can use real-
time measurements in order to identify the actual 
occurrence of a contingency, its degree of severity, and, 
whenever this contingency is found to be harmful, to 
design and trigger appropriate remedial actions, in real 
time [10]. 
In the following, a short description of various 
operations by SIME is provided. 
Computation of stability limits. The search of stability 
limits (critical clearing times – CCT, or power limits) 
generally relies on the computation of margins and their 
pair-wise extrapolation. The search is iterative and 
proceeds by simulating successive unstable cases of 
decreasing severity, assessed by their negative margin. 
The simulations stop as soon as a stable case is met.  
Contingency filtering. The approximate search of a 
first-swing stability limit generally requires only two 
unstable simulations. Thus, given a clearing time, the 
contingency will be: either first swing stable; or first 
swing unstable (i.e. margin η < 0). 
In the latter case, a more refined classification into 
multi-swing harmless, potentially harmful or harmful 
contingency may be obtained, using a second 
simulation with a smaller clearing time. 
Transient stability control.  Stabilizing an unstable 
contingency (i.e. a contingency with a negative margin) 
is equivalent to canceling out its margin. Increasing the 
margin to zero and up, may be obtained by acting on the 
OMIB mechanical power. By using the equal-area 
criterion (EAC), a first guess of the total generation 
power to be shifted from critical machines (CMs) to 
non-critical machines (NMs) can be provided.  
As NMs are generally many more than CMs, the 
corresponding rescheduling of NMs may be conducted 
so as to comply with additional (e.g. economic) 
objectives.  
Contingency FILtering, Ranking &  Assessment 
(FILTRA). Contingency filtering ranking and 
assessment is schematically represented in Figure 2 that 
consists of two blocks.  
1st Block: For a given clearing time CT1, the 
contingencies are classified  
• either as First Swing Stable (FSS) and are 
discarded  
• or as First Swing Unstable (FSU) and are sent to 
the second block, along with the corresponding 
negative margin, η1.  
 
2nd Block: each FSU contingency is reconsidered, using 
a CT2 < CT1 and 
• if η2 < 0, the contingency is declared to be harmful  
• otherwise, i.e., if η2 > 0, the contingency is declared 
to be Multi Swing Stable (MSS). Its critical clearing 
time (CCT) is computed by interpolation and 
compared to a third CT3, and if: 
- CCT > CT3, the contingency is declared to be 
harmless and is discarded. 
- CCT< CT3 the contingency is declared to be 
potentially harmful and stored for possible 








Figure 2:  FILtering Ranking and Assessment (FILTRA). 
Numbers in brackets correspond to a stability exploration of 
the Brazilian system [10] 
Integrated transient stability assessment and control. 
Within the OMASES project, the various tasks to be 
performed by the integrated Transient Stability 
Assessment and Control (TSA&C) scheme for 
stabilizing on-line possible transient instabilities in the 
preventive mode are described in Figure 3 for a single-
processor solution.  
Application of parallel processing is possible with no 
particular complication of the overall framework and 



























The TSA&C scheme works in the following way. The 
output of the Energy Management System (EMS) state 
estimator provides the data for obtaining the Operating 
State (OS) of the system. The OS can be obtained by 
running: (a) either a power flow program  or (b) an 
Optimal Power Flow (OPF) program for computing an 
operating condition which meets a predefined objective 
function (e.g., maximum power transfer on 
predetermined tie-lines; minimum generation cost; etc), 
while respecting the static constraints of the 
transmission network elements (bus voltage and power 
line limits). The operating state and a list of possible 
contingencies selected by the operator are sent to the 
FILTRA block. 
The FILTRA package (block (1) in Figure 3) 
identifies the set of unstable (harmful) contingencies 
from a very large initial set of probable contingencies. 
At the same time, it also computes stability margins and 
finds the set of critical machines corresponding to each 




































Figure 3:  Transient Stability  Assessment & Control 
After receiving the information about critical 
machines and margins, the Transient Stability Control 
Block (block (2) in Figure 3) performs the stabilization 
of the harmful contingencies. This procedure can be 
done for stabilizing a single contingency (the most 
critical one) or a selected set of harmful or even the 
whole set of harmful contingencies. This is a choice the 
operator must make depending on the current operating 
policy. As an example, for stabilizing the whole set of 
harmful contingencies, the integrated TSA&C scheme 
performs the following functions: 
- determine the corresponding control actions (the 
total active generation shift from Critical Machines 
to Non-Critical machines) for each one of the 
unstable (harmful) contingencies; 
- determine the generation shift on each critical 
machine, from the total generation shift, for each 
one of the unstable (harmful) contingencies;  
- combining the resulting control actions, compute 
the amount of active power change on each critical 
machine, necessary to stabilize all harmful 
contingencies simultaneously. 
The reschedule of system machines is then 
performed using a conventional power flow program. 
Generation shifting is directly applied on critical 
machines and the corresponding amount of active 
power reallocation on non-critical machines is 
performed considering several criteria. As an example, 
the power on non-critical machines can be assigned in 
proportion to their inertia coefficient. 
The improved operating state and the list of harmful 
contingencies are sent to the Transient Stability 
Assessment Block (block (3) in Figure 3) that assesses 
again the transient stability of the power system with 
respect to the set of harmful contingencies. If the 
assessment block finds that the system is still unstable 
under some contingencies, it computes the 
corresponding margins, identifies the critical machines 
and sends this information back to the Transient 
Stability Control block (2). If the power system is stable 
for all contingencies, the new operating state is declared 
to be secure and the process stops. 
The cycle is repeated until stabilizing all unstable 
contingencies. It is found that, generally, the process 
converges to the solution after two to three iterations. A 
final check is then performed to verify that the 
procedure has not destabilized any of the previously 
potentially harmful contingencies (mandatory) and 
harmless contingencies (optional). 
3 APPLICATION TO A REALISTIC SYSTEM 
3.1 Set-up of the Experimentation Site 
The Italian test site was installed in December 2002. 
The experimentation concerned portability issues, in 
particular the operation of the data transfer module 
between Italian EMS and OMASES platform: both the 
automatic file creation and transfer in real time mode, 
and the system model conversion in the OMASES 
format were thus checked. The experimentation also 
regarded the correct operation of the platform from a 
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Within the Italian experimentation site, OMASES 
TSA and VSA functions have been tested both in the 
Real-time mode (on-line) and in the Engineering mode 
(off-line) [4], [6]. The experimentation of TS and MS 
were out of scope of this Experimentation Site. 
The Real-time mode is mainly concerned with the 
overall platform testing, and with the filtering/ranking 
capabilities, as it is rare that truly jeopardised situations 
occur: in fact the Italian power system is usually 
operated in a conservative manner, with N-1 (and 
sometimes even N-2) criterion being satisfied.  
The Engineering mode is more suitable for a 
systematic validation of the tool capabilities and its 
tuning. In particular, it makes it possible to check the 
output of the tool when heavily stressed scenarios are 
concerned. In the Engineering mode, if the initial 
conditions are “excessively” secure, the power system 
may be stressed in a variety of ways: for instance: by 
increasing the load or the power transfer between areas, 
by weakening the topology and/or the generation 
capacity, by creating low voltage conditions. The aim is 
to find the system limits and to compare suggested 
preventive actions with those used in the past or 
suggested by operator’s experience.  
In order to fit the Italian EMS snapshots into the 
OMASES database, a bridge between the Italian EMS 
and OMASES was realized at the Italian site. The 
bridge performs data conversion to the OMASES 
format and can be used for on-line acquisition of the 
data which are then processed. The bridge from EMS 
data to OMASES data was developed by CESI.  
Besides data format translation (sometimes including 
also model adaptations), an “island filter” was included 
to provide OMASES with a single electrical island data, 
as the presently developed platform is able to process 
only one connected network at a time. The overall 
importation scheme is reported in Figure 4. The import 
tool is not optimised, but it can fulfil the needs of the 
experimentation. In the Real Time mode the estimated 
snapshot of the network was loaded every 15 minutes.  
The file transfer was performed on a Wide Area 
Network (WAN). The final installation within a TSO 




















Figure 4:  Data import from EMS 
This import tool demonstrates, as confirmed by the 
tests, that OMASES platform can be installed in 
different EMS systems. The platform can in fact be 
“plugged” into existing EMS databases, by building an 
appropriate “bridge”. 
3.2 The Italian Power System 
The network under analysis was the complete Italian 
power system as in 2003, provided by the National 
TSO. It consists of the 400 kV and 220 kV and the main 
150 kV lines and stations, along with generators and 
equivalent loads. It is stored in the OMASES database 
used in the Real-Time mode.  
The Italian power system is characterised by a 
significantly longitudinal structure, which leads to the 
definition of critical interfaces (also called critical 
sections). An instance of critical interface is the 
interconnection with Central Europe, constituted by 15 
tie-lines of which 6 are 400 kV lines and 9 are 220 kV 
lines. 
Electrical energy import is very important for Italy, 
and the interconnection is highly stressed. Moreover, 
also the internal North-to-South connections exhibit 
similar characteristics. The loss of a line on a critical 
interface may cause overloads on the remaining lines or 
dynamic problems. Hence, the corresponding scenarios 
need to be properly evaluated in terms of dynamic 
evolution, by performing contingency filtering and 
ranking.  
The examined Italian network consisted of: 
 Grid: 1118 Lines; 7234  Nodes – about 1500 Buses 
The number of buses depends on the actual state of 
the network whereas the number of nodes is a 
network characteristic. The bus number is related to 
the actually energised nodes; 5778 Switches (1018 
Bus bar couplers); 
 Machines: 467 Synchronous generators, AVRs, 
system excitation limits; Hydraulic, Thermal (steam 
and gas) Governors and turbines; 
 Transformers: 1082 two/three windings, 363 ULTC 
 Loads: 1046 Static and dynamic loads. 
 
The grid description – in terms of network 
description and operating condition – was imported 
automatically from existent network database whereas 
the dynamic description, both for long term dynamics 
and short term dynamics, was provided either by hand 
or partially automatically downloaded by database, and 
makes use of different models for TSA and VSA. 
TSA systematically performs the following tasks: (a) 
investigate large numbers (hundreds) of (credible) 
contingencies; (b) extract a subset of those that may 
threaten system security (contingency filtering and 
ranking); (c) provide possible preventive remedial 
actions. 
The most important aspect of the TSA validation 
phase at CESI site concerned its functionality, 
particularly for the FILTRA function that allows 
selecting potentially harmful contingencies. This has 
been tested and the present section reports on  relevant 
results. A significant aspect of the testing consisted of 
comparing the simulation outputs of the TSA functions 
with a reference that represents the “real” system 
  
behaviour. For the Italian system this reference has been 
the electromechanical and long-term simulator SICRE 
[12], developed by CESI. As the OMASES Application 
Function TSA used the Eurostag package [9], it was 
important for the models adopted in the OMASES TSA 
Application Function to be comparable to those 
implemented in SICRE. Proper adaptations to reproduce 
the models originally used in the Italian simulator were 
required.  
The OMASES simulator Eurostag is a powerful 
simulator, which allows the user to build his own 
dynamic models. A preliminary consideration concerns 
the time span that is going to be simulated: in the case 
of TSA, a few seconds are sufficient, since experience 
suggests that multi-swing transient instability 
phenomena are not likely to occur in the Italian system. 
This allowed neglecting the slow dynamics that a 
simulator takes into account. Under such assumptions, 
for example, the boiler representation (steam plants) can 
be highly simplified, and LTCs can be assumed fixed.  
The most important models related to TSA concern, in 
fact,  the representation of synchronous machine, AVR, 
PSS, and turbine governor. Apart from the synchronous 
machine, the other models were built by means of 
Eurostag macro-blocks reproducing the standard Italian 
AVR and PSS models. Proper adaptations were made to 
implement turbine governors.  
3.3 Results from TSA testing 
The functionality of TSA has been tested as 
described in the following. A snapshot of the EMS 
output is correctly transferred to the OMASES 
database. In the Real-Time mode the following 
operations are automatically performed: 
(1) Dynamic data preparation (TSA folder and 
configuration file creation) 
(2) Retrieving of contingency and other TSA 
parameters from the database 
(3) Loading of static system data and execution of 
load flow  
(4) Execution of FILTRA and CONTROL modules, 
including the necessary dynamic simulations. 
 
The settings related to TSA FILTRA operation are 
stored in the TSA database as well as the data for 
dynamic simulation. Different sets of contingencies 
have been used to verify the TSA function.  
A complete set of three-phase short circuit 
contingencies followed by line tripping for (N-1) 
criterion  analysis in the entire network was initially 
tested. Critical lines have been identified and mainly 
corresponded to lines connecting, or close to, power 
plants and specifically for those plants weakly 
connected to the HV grid. Table I reports a list of 
contingencies selected for analysis. Further, some 
interconnection lines located in the production areas in 
the South of Italy have been tested.  
During real-time experimentation, the Italian 
network did not experience any particular transient 
stability problem. 
Line ID Description (faulted line) 
Cont_220 kV_line _16 BIELLA EST-->TURBIGO ST 
Cont_220 kV_line _17 SPEZIA STA-->AVENZA 
Cont_220 kV_line _18 SPEZIA STA-->COLORNO 
Cont_220 kV_line _19 MESE-->GORDUNO 
Cont_220 kV_line _20 SONDRIO-->ROBBIA 
Cont_220 kV_line _28 OSTIGLIA-->BUSS. S.S. 
Cont_400 kV_line _14 TURBIGO ST-->RONDISSONE 
Cont_400 kV_line _16 OSTIGLIA-->DUGALE 
Cont_400 kV_line _17 OSTIGLIA-->FERRARA F. 
Cont_400 kV_line _22 PORTOTOLLE-->FORLI' 
Cont_400 kV_line _29 RAVENNA C.-->PORTOTOLLE 
Cont_400 kV_line _34 MONTALTO-->SUVERETO 
Cont_400 kV_line _42 PRESENZANO-->VALMONTONE 
Cont_400 kV_line _9 SPEZIA STA-->MARGINONE 
Table I:  Partial list of the most representative 
contingencies for TSA 
 
Figure 5 reports some results referring to a real case 
analysed during the testing phase. With reference to 
Figure 2 in section 2.3, the FILTRA parameters were 
selected as: CT1 = 300 ms, CT2 = 250 ms, CT3 = 200 
ms, that represent the thresholds for considering a three-
phase short circuit contingency respectively “FSU”, 
“harmful” and “potentially harmful”. 
It can be noted that the list of dangerous 
contingencies is really small compared to the full list of 
contingencies filtered, as nearly all of the analysed 
cases were found first-swing stable (FSS in Figure 5).  
 






Figure 5:  Output of FILTRA module: TSA parameters and 
list of contingencies ranked in a severity order 
One major aspect of FILTRA is the capacity to 
assess the dangerous contingency faster than the CCT 
calculation, even if the calculus of the CCT is not exact. 
In fact, for example, the contingency MM1317 is 
declared unstable (HS in Figure 5) with a CCT larger 
than 290 ms, while the exact value calculated is 296 ms. 
On the other hand the identification of this contingency 
as a dangerous one is correct. In any case, by a 
particular functionality of the FILTRA module, it is 
possible to assess very precisely the CCT of each 
  
contingency. This powerful facility is more dedicated to 
the engineering mode of the OMASES platform. 
One major value of the TSA function is to provide 
the operator with a list of possible actions to stabilise 
the system against a set of contingencies. The control 
function suggests how to stabilize the contingencies 
declared harmful by FILTRA and evaluates the power 
that should be re-scheduled from the critical to the non-
critical machines. An example of  the results of this 
action related to one harmful case is reported in Table 
II. 
Figure 6 reports the details concerning the most 
severe identified harmful contingency for the examined 
case. It is taken from the OMASES User Interface for 
the Real Time mode. Several pieces of information are 
provided, among which the name of the contingency, 
the detail of each simulation (clearing time, margin, 
stability judgement, simulated time etc.), the computed 
CCT and the final rank. 
 
Rescheduling of  Critical Machine for one specific harmful 
contingency identified by FILTRA 





ANPPG2  73.30 63.56 9.738 
ANPPG3  78.20 68.46 9.738 
BRNNG3  181.20 161.06 20.143 
ROSNG1  296.70 274.85 21.849 
ROSNG2  316.10 294.25 21.849 
ROSNG3  320.00 298.15 21.849 
ROSNG4  304.60 282.75 21.849 
TIMPG4  280.70 258.85 21.849 
TIMPG5  279.40 257.55 21.849 
ISBAGA  159.50 139.25 20.249 
ISBAGC  156.00 135.75 20.249 
SFMPG3  160.00 148.79 11.215 
ROSNGA  88.90 80.63 8.271 
ROSNGC  98.50 90.23 8.271 
ROSNGE  102.00 93.73 8.271 
TIMPGA  110.60 102.33 8.271 
TIMPGC  112.50 104.23 8.271 
BSCNG1  637.00 448.94 188.060 
BSCNG2  652.80 464.74 188.060 
BSCNG3  617.20 429.14 188.060 
BSCNG4  622.40 434.34 188.060 
SFMPG6  244.40 222.55 21.849 
ISBAG1  108.50 91.77 16.731 
ISBAG2  107.30 90.57 16.731 
Table II:  Rescheduling of Critical Machines for a harmful 
contingency 
 
The OMASES TSA function was also tested for 
heavily stressed system conditions, generated on 
purpose. In this case, the starting point consisted of a 
real time snapshot, and the stress was implemented by a 
topology change. The considered situation was that of 
12/6/2003 at 11:30, characterised by a very high 
demand due to temperature rather higher than usual. A 
weakening of the system was then obtained by opening 
a line near Brindisi power station (South of Italy).  
For this stressed case, the validation phase included 
comparison of the simulation outputs of the TSA 
function with the electromechanical and long-term 
simulator SICRE, developed by CESI, taken as the 
reference. A complete comparative analysis is here 
reported  for contingency affecting line NN1322. When 
performing  a full simulation with SICRE a dichotomy 
process was used to assess the CCT related to the 
outage of this line. The approximate value of the CCT 
computed with SICRE is about 135-140 ms, against the 
value calculated by FILTRA, i.e. 142 ms.  
 
 
Figure 6:  FILTRA output for the modified case 
The artificially stressed operating point mentioned 
above, caused a low critical clearing time (CCT  = 117 
ms) for a three-phase short-circuit fault on the Brindisi–
Taranto line (NN1320) close to Brindisi power station.  
Figure 7 shows the identified critical machines of 
Brindisi power plant. These machines matches with the 
analysis performed SICRE. The OMASES Control 
function determined the margin and the amount of 
power to be re-scheduled among the non-critical 
machines in order to make the system able to withstand 
this contingency (NN1320) with an imposed new 
clearing time of 180 ms, quite larger than the previously 
computed CCT of 117 ms. 
 
Figure 7:  FILTRA results and critical machines of Brindisi 
power station 
Table III presents the final output of the OMASES 
Control function: it helps the operator to re-schedule 
properly the power of the critical machines to non 
critical machines for a total amount of about 468 MW. 
The amount of power to be re-scheduled is 
significantly large. Therefore to reduce it, the control 
function was run again with a less demanding 
requirement: the desired clearing time of the system was 
  
set at the value of 150 ms. Table IV shows that the 
amount of power to be re-scheduled is drastically 
decreased (257 MW) but, as it is clearly shown, the 
Critical machines are many more. 
 









BRNNG3  181.20 160.94 20.265 
BSCNG1  637.00 525.09 111.909 
BSCNG2  652.80 540.89 111.909 
BSCNG3  617.20 505.30 111.899 
BSCNG4  622.40 510.50 111.899 
Table III:  Output of the Control function for the stressed 
case, contingency NN1320 
 




in MW  




BRNNG3  181.20 175.16 6.043 
TIMPG4  280.70 274.66 6.043 
TIMPG5  279.40 273.36 6.043 
ISBAGA  159.50 153.91 5.594 
ISBAGC  156.00 150.41 5.594 
SFMPG3  160.00 156.90 3.103 
TIMPGA  110.60 108.31 2.289 
TIMPGC  112.50 110.21 2.289 
BSCNG1  637.00 585.88 51.117 
BSCNG2  652.80 601.68 51.117 
BSCNG3  617.20 566.08 51.117 
BSCNG4  622.40 571.28 51.117 
SFMPG6  244.40 238.36 6.043 
ISBAG1  108.50 103.87 4.625 
ISBAG2  107.30 102.67 4.625 
Table IV:  Output of the Control function for the stressed 
case, contingency NN1320:  alternative solution. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The paper has presented a technical overview of a 
significant European Research Project on Dynamic 
Security Assessment. The presentation specifically 
focused on the Transient Security Assessment function 
for identifying harmful and potentially harmful 
contingencies in power system operation. The function 
is also able to suggest preventive countermeasures so as 
to bring power system operating point back from alert 
to normal condition. 
The experimentation phase proved that OMASES 
can effectively be linked to an existing Energy 
Management System, e.g. a proprietary system with its 
own system model and data format, such as the Italian 
one. The only requirement consists of developing an 
appropriate bridge for on-line data acquisition and 
conversion into OMASES format.  
The real time tests showed the functionality of the 
on-line platform and, in particular, the filtering/ranking 
capabilities of the tool. Some off-line studies performed 
on artificially stressed scenarios allowed to confirm the 
ability of the package to correctly identify critical 
situations and provide preventive control 
countermeasures, such as generation re-scheduling. 
Results of the experimental process permitted the 
tuning and validation of the DSA platform in terms of 
experience and feed-backs for what concerns the 
effective possibilities of filtering, screening and 
stabilizing contingencies in large electrical power 
systems. 
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